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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we provide an overview of important aspects of the postwar Japanese experience 
with employee participation and labor-management cooperation. First we review the scope and 
nature of participatory employment practices in Japan and their diffusion among Japanese firms 
over time. We then turn to the evidence on the effects of such practices on company 
performance. Third we provide some preliminary findings from our most recent research on the 
responses of participatory employment practices to the economic slowdown in the 1990s and 
speculate on the future of participatory employment practices in Japan. The paper's key findings 
include: (i) as a result of favorable environments in the postwar Japanese economy, in particular 
in manufacturing, participatory employment practices spread widely and were established firmly; 
(ii) such practices are found to have positive effects on company performance in the long-run; 
(iii) evidence was found for the complementarities among these practices; and (iv) participatory 
employment practices appear to be surviving in general in the economic slowdown in the 1990s 
whereas subtle yet potentially important changes in various attributes of participatory 
employment practices are taking place. 
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PARTICIPATORY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN JAPAN: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
I. Introduction 
In many countries around the world, management systems are changing away from the traditional 
system characterized by often adversarial collective bargaining and a fixed wage contractual 
payment basis. Prominent among these changes is the explosion in the use and interest in 
participatory employment practices or Human Resource Management Practices (HRMPs).1 In 
this paper we provide an overview of important aspects of the postwar Japanese experience with 
these HRMPs. Our discussion is in three main parts. First we review the scope and nature of 
Japanese HRMPs and their diffusion among Japanese firms over time. We then turn to the 
evidence on the effects of such practices on company performance. Third we provide some 
preliminary findings from our most recent research on the responses of participatory employment 
practices to the economic slowdown in the 1990s and speculate on the future of participatory 
employment practices in Japan. 
A closer look at the postwar Japanese experience of employee participation and labor-
management cooperation in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and their effects on work-place 
productivity (and, thus, competitiveness) appears to be of particular public policy interest for 
many countries considering participatory employment practices a way to improve their 
productivity performance and thus competitiveness. 
First, as Levine and Tyson (1990) suggest, relatively higher job security (often ensured by 
intra-firm transfers and transfers to related firms) and strong group cohesiveness (supported by 
1
 See, for instance, Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (1994) and Levine (1995). 
1 
compression of wage and status differentials) of Japanese workers in large manufacturing firms 
in the postwar period point to an industrial relations system favorable to successful employee 
participation. Moreover, relatively more rapid and stable growth over the sample period, lower 
unemployment and stable financial corporate grouping (banks and institutional shareholders as 
stable, long-term suppliers of capital) point to an external environment favorable to successful 
employee participation. 
Probably as a result of these favorable environments in the postwar Japanese economy, in 
particular in manufacturing, participatory employment practices spread widely and were 
established firmly as we document below. Indeed these practices became the hallmark of 
"Japanese management," which has been inspiring (or necessitating in some instances) many 
corporations in the world to experiment with employee involvement and labor-management 
cooperation in recent years (see, for instance, Levine, 1995: 5). In short, the postwar Japanese 
economy (especially in manufacturing) clearly represents one of the most important examples of 
experimentation with HRMPs. 
The economic slowdown in the 1990s (in particular the recent banking crisis) and a 
rapidly aging workforce have allegedly been eroding the aforementioned participation-friendly 
environments. Have participatory employment practices that we find successful for the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s been surviving in Japan in the 1990s? If so, how have they been evolving to 
cope with these new environments in the 1990s? Are there any differences between sectors in 
the survival of participatory employment practices? A closer look at the recent Japanese 
experience with participatory employment practices will help us understand better two key 
questions regarding participation: (i) what are the conditions under which participatory 
employment practices are best introduced and best sustained; and (ii) in what way participatory 
2 
employment practices will need to evolve when external environments change. To address these 
questions, we have been analyzing more recent data on some of these participatory employment 
practices. This paper reports some of our first findings on the responses of participatory 
employment practices to the economic slowdown in the 1990s. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the scope and nature of 
participatory employment practices in postwar Japan and their diffusion over time. Section in 
summarizes theoretical arguments for the effects of these practices on company performance, in 
particular labor productivity, and reviews the evidence on such effects. Section VI presents our 
findings on the responses of participatory employment practices to the economic slowdown in 
the 1990s, followed by a concluding section. 
II. The Scope, Nature and Diffusion of Participatory Employment Practices in Japan 
A. Joint Labor Management Committees (JLMCs): Information sharing at the top. 
One of the core mechanisms for labor-management relations within a large Japanese firm is joint 
labor-management committees (JLMCs). Established at the top level (corporate and/or 
establishment level) and involving both management and union representatives, JLMCs serve as 
a mechanism for information sharing at the top level on a large variety of issues ranging from 
basic business policies to working conditions. 
Unlike German works councils, the establishment of JLMCs is not obligatory under 
Japanese law, and therefore, is voluntary. When there is a union, labor-side representatives are 
almost always union representatives, while even in the absence of unions, the majority of 
labor-side JLMC members are elected by employee vote (about 70%, Koike, 1978). Thus, labor-
side JLMC members usually legitimately represent the interests of the firm's workforce. 
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According to Shimada (1992), JLMCs were one of the many labor-management 
institutions proposed at the beginning of 1950s by the Japan Productivity Center. After a decade 
of tumultuous labor-management relations between 1945 and 1955, Japanese unions and 
management, with the endorsement from the central government, began to implement a number 
of well-known human resource management techniques including JLMCs and semi-annual bonus 
payments to all employees. According to Kato and Morishima (1998), in 1950 about 20 percent 
of all firms including both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms had standing JLMCs. 
During the next two decades, the institution diffused rapidly (at a rate of about 20 percentage 
points for each decade. Thus, by 1970 the figure had risen to close to 60 percent. For the next 
two decades the institution diffused steadily, and, as of 1993, fully 80 percent of all firms 
reported to have standing JLMCs. 
Many observers attribute the peaceful firm-level labor relations observed in Japanese 
firms to the establishment of JLMCs (Shimada, .1992; Inagami, 1988). Within JLMCs, which 
meet almost once a month, a number of issues are discussed, ranging from basic business 
policies to social and athletic activities sponsored by the firm (see Kato and Morishima, 1998). 
According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour in 1985 on the types of issues 
discussed in JLMCs and the degree of employee participation in each issue (quoted in Inagami, 
1988), firms use JLMCs at least for information sharing on a wide variety of issues. In 
particular, more than 60% of the firms use JLMCs for information sharing for basic management 
decisions such as business strategies and production and sales plans. However, in many cases, 
the degree of employee influence with regard to these issues is small, with almost 79% of the 
firms only sharing information but not going any further. In contrast, when the issues more 
directly relate to employment conditions (such as working hours and holidays, wages and 
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bonuses, and layoffs and employment adjustment), a large proportion of firms use JLMCs to 
consult with labor and even to allow employee representatives to participate in joint decision 
making. For example, out of the firms that discuss wage and employment security issues, more 
than 87% of the firms at least consult with labor representatives prior to making these plans. 
Thus, for direct labor issues, JLMCs appear to go beyond simple information sharing and serve a 
function of labor-management consultation and occasionally even joint decision making. 
B. Shop-floor Committees (SFCs): Information sharing at the grass roots 
Aside from JLMCs and formal trade unions, many Japanese corporations have shop-floor 
committees (SFCs) in which supervisors and employees on shop floor discuss issues such as 
shop-floor operations and shop-floor environments. Though the potentially important role of 
SFCs in the Japanese industrial relations system has been suggested (see, for instance, Koike, 
1978), the nature and scope of these SFCs have not been studied extensively largely due to the 
absence of reliable data. A recent survey conducted by Kato and Morishima (1998) reveals that 
the average SFC meets about nine times a year (slightly less frequently than JLMCs); and that 
Information shared during the SFC meetings tends to go beyond standard shop-floor issues such 
as safety and health, fringe benefits, training and development, and grievances, and includes 
business and strategic plans. As such, SFCs are aimed at information sharing at the grass roots 
level. 
Kato and Morishima (1998) also reveals the diffusion of SFCs among Japanese firms in 
the postwar era. In 1950, only 7 percent of all firms including both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms had a standing SFC. During the next decade the institution did not diffuse 
much, reaching only 11 percent of firms by the end of the decade. Since then, however, the 
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institution diffused steadily; in 1993 more than 40 percent of all firms reported to have standing 
SFCs (for manufacturing firms, more than 50% reported to have standing SFCs). 
C. Small Group Activities (SGAs): Team 
SGAs are activities such as quality control (QC) circles and Zero Defects in which small groups 
at the workplace level voluntarily set plans and goals concerning operations and work together 
toward accomplishing these plans and goals. The wide use of SGAs such as QC circles by 
Japanese firms is, by now, quite well-known (see, for instance, Cole, 1989). In 1950 almost no 
firm (only 3 percent) used an SGA. In 1960 only 6 percent of firms had an SGA. The rapid 
diffusion of the institution began in 1960s. By the beginning of 1970s, about one in four firms 
were practicing an SGA, and the figure reached 44 percent in 1980. Since then the institution has 
grown steadily; in 1993 70 percent of firms reported practicing an SGA (Kato, 1995). 
SGAs are clearly more popular among larger firms (80 percent of firms with 5,000 or 
more employees practice an SGA as opposed to 43 percent of firms with 299 or fewer). 
Moreover, SGAs are more wide-spread in the unionized sector (Kato, 1995). 
D. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs): Financial participation via stock 
Japanese ESOPs are perhaps best understood by comparing their main features with the better 
known U.S. ESOPs. Unlike U.S. ESOPs, Japanese corporations establishing an ESOP (called 
mochikabukai) do not receive any tax incentive to do so. To induce individual employees to 
participate in the ESOP, companies offer subsidies (typically the firm matching each employee's 
contribution by giving 5 to 10 percent of the contribution as well as bearing administrative costs). 
Whereas ESOPs elsewhere frequently are structured so as to encourage strong participation by 
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top management, in Japan executives (as well as part time and temporary employees) are 
normally ineligible for membership. As is the norm elsewhere, individual participants' shares 
(and dividends) in the ESOP are held in trust. Unusually, however, each participant has a right to 
withdraw his/her shares, and share withdrawals are privately owned. Permission to withdraw is 
normally subject to the following requirements: (i) employees must keep at least 1,000 shares in 
the trust; and (ii) withdrawals are permitted only in 1,000 shares, round lots. It takes more than 
20 years for the average participant to accumulate 2,000 shares so that he/she can withdraw 1,000 
shares for the first time. While members may freely exit completely from the ESOP, re-entry is 
restricted. Exiting employees will receive their shares in 1,000 shares, round lots, and must sell 
the remaining shares to the trust at the prevailing market price. Upon retirement, model rules 
adopted by most ESOPs require retiring workers to exit completely from the ESOP. Finally, the 
general director (rijicho) represents stockholders in the ESOP. The general director is chosen by 
other participants, on a one-participant, one-vote basis. At the general meeting of shareholders, 
the general director votes the stock held by the plan, deciding independently, rather than by 
tabulating votes of employee participants. The general director must be a participant in the 
ESOP and thus is not an executive (Jones and Kato, 1995). 
The survey conducted by Kato and Morishima (1998) shows that ESOPs are a relatively 
new and the most rapidly diffused innovation among various Japanese HRMPs. Thus, in 1960 
the proportion of firms that had an ESOP was only 4 percent. The proportion grew rapidly 
during the next decade, reaching 26 percent by 1970. In 1967, a special government committee 
on foreign capital advocated employee ownership as a way to help prevent foreign takeovers of 
domestic firms. The government, using informal channels, encouraged firms to set up new 
ESOP trusts to accommodate employee investments in their stock. While the fear of foreign 
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takeovers diminished in the 1970s, the idea of employee ownership took root. Perhaps partly due 
to this government initiative of 1967, the 1970s were characterized by an astonishing pace of 
diffusion of the institution, and over two thirds of firms came to have ESOPs by 1980. The 
diffusion continued even after 1980, and in 1993 it became almost a universal phenomenon (97 
percent of firms reported to have an ESOP in that year and there is no significant difference 
between manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms). 
The survey also shows that in 1993, almost 50 percent of the labor force in firms with 
ESOPs participated in ESOPs. Furthermore, concerning employee stakes, Jones and Kato (1995) 
report that, in 1988, ESOPs owned stock worth 4.1 trillion yen (about 32 billion dollars); this 
amounts to 1.7 million yen (about 14,000 dollars) per participant. 
However, according to Jones and Kato (1995), these plans do not own large percentages 
of company stock. For listed companies the average proportion of stock owned by ESOPs has 
varied between 0.66 percent and 1.42 percent from 1973 to 1988. In 1988 the average was lower 
than 1 percent and holdings over 5 percent were rare. 
E. Profit Sharing Plans (PSPs): Financial participation via bonus 
PSPs are a pay system in which the total amount of bonuses are linked to a measure of firm 
performance, such as profit. The Japanese bonus payment system has attracted considerable 
attention and controversy (e.g. Freeman and Weitzman, 1987, Nakamura and Nakamura, 1989, 
Hashimoto, 1990, Hart and Kawasaki, 1995). In light of the ongoing debate between those who 
stress the profit sharing aspect of the Japanese bonus system (e.g., Freeman and Weitzman, 1987) 
and those who downplay it (e.g., Ohashi, 1989, Brunello, 1991), we consider only the least 
controversial (with respect to the profit-sharing aspect of the bonus payment system) types of the 
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bonus payment system, i.e., the bonus payment system with a formal contract stipulating the 
presence of the profit-sharing plan. 
According to Kato and Morishima (1998), one in four firms had a PSP in 1993 (no 
appreciable difference between manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms). The proportion of 
firms with a PSP was only 5 percent in 1960 and grew steadily to 14 percent by 1980. A 
significant diffusion occurred during the 1980s, however, with the proportion of firms with PSPs 
growing to over 20 percent by 1990. 
PSPs are found to be more prevalent in smaller firms. For instance, the proportion of 
firms with 5,000 or more employees that had a PSP was only 11 percent. The large majority (70 
percent) of firms with a PSP reported separate profit-sharing plans for officers and non-officers. 
However, Japanese PSPs do not normally distinguish between union and non-union members 
(only one-thirds of firms with PSPs reported separate PSPs for union and non-union members). 
PSPs are mostly company-wide with only 12 percent of firms with PSPs reporting separate plans 
for different divisions and occupations. Moreover, nearly all Japanese PSPs are cash plans (98 
percent), which is in sharp contrast to the U.S. where deferred plans are more popular (see Kruse 
1993: 16-17). Being almost always cash plans, Japanese PSPs have no tax advantage. 
The majority of Japanese PSPs (55 percent) do not have set formula (or are fully 
discretionary) for how the contribution should be tied to profits, which is also in contrast to PSPs 
in the U.S. where only 22 percent are fully discretionary (Kruse, 1993: 75). 
III. The Effects of Participatory Employment Practices 
In general, formal economic theory is ambiguous as to the expected effect of participatory 
employment practices on productivity and firm performance. (For reviews, see the essays in 
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Blinder, 1990). Focusing on individual motivation and performance, however, several hypotheses 
predict positive effects, of which the following two (Goal Alignment Effects and Human Capital 
Effects) are perhaps most important. In addition, there are a few hypotheses concerning the 
complementarities among HRMPs. 
A. Goal Alignment Effects of HRMPs 
Consider financial participation first as they are the easiest example by which one can understand 
how the goal alignment effects arise. PSPs help align the interest of the firm with the interest of 
its employees by linking pay for employees to firm performance such as profitability. Likewise 
the most direct positive effects of ESOPs result from enterprise success being reflected in a 
higher price of its equity, and thus higher wealth for employees who own stock in the ESOP. In 
such cases, the interest of the firm is more aligned with the interest of its employees. 
These interest alignment effects of financial participation can be expected to be more sig-
nificant in Japan than in the U.S. First, for both PSPs and ESOPs Japanese firms do not receive 
any tax incentive to establish financial participation. In this sense, the intent of Japanese firms to 
introduce financial participation can be interpreted by their employees as more "genuinely 
participatory" than in the U.S. Second, concerning ESOPs, normally executives are ineligible for 
membership in Japanese ESOPs whereas ESOPs in the U.S. often are structured to encourage 
strong participation by top management (Jones and Kato, 1995). U.S. ESOPs frequently are 
designed to prevent participation by groups of non-executive employees, especially union 
members (Blasi, 1988). But in Japan typically all full-time non-executive employees are eligible 
for membership and, based on our interviews with managers of several Japanese manufacturing 
corporations, it appears that blue-collar workers actively participate in ESOPs. Third, with 
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regard to PSPs, as Kruse (1993) show, cash plans tend to have a greater productivity effect than 
deferred plans, and plans without set formula (and therefore based on trust) tend to do better than 
other plans. As discussed above, almost all Japanese PSPs are cash plans and a substantially 
higher proportion of Japanese PSPs are without set formula than US PSPs. Lastly, the average 
ESOP participant owns a substantial amount of stock, worth 14,000 dollars on average. 
The goal alignment effects of information sharing and employee involvement via JLMCs, 
SFCs and SGAs are more subtle (but not necessarily weaker). First, information sharing and 
employee involvement are expected to reduce information asymmetry between labor and 
management and, consequently, avoid the development of adversarial labor-management 
relations. In labor-management relations, employers are said to have more information about the 
status of the firm and business strategies. Workers, under usual collective bargaining 
arrangements, have no means of obtaining such information except to resort to hard bargaining 
often coupled with the threat of strikes (Tracy, 1986). Such behavior on the part of the unions 
and employees may lead to adversarial labor relations, which may, in turn, have negative 
consequences for productivity. Voluntary information sharing by management, via such 
mechanism as JLMCs and SFCs, is likely to reduce the cost of such information asymmetry and 
is likely to have positive effects on productivity. 
Second, employers may voluntarily share information to enhance worker loyalty (Kleiner 
and Bouillon, 1991). Worker cooperation may also be obtained through higher workers 
commitment and loyalty. Enhanced worker loyalty and cooperative behavior are all predicted to 
have positive effects on productivity. In economic terms, sharing information on private 
information which has been heretofore restricted to owners and top management is likely to lead 
to goal alignment and trust between labor and management. Better informed via JLMCs and 
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SFCs, workers, while still striving for their own benefit, may be more likely to be convinced that 
it is in their interest to cooperate with management and improve productivity and firm 
performance. They may see more clearly the path from their own behavior to enlargement of the 
benefits through firm prosperity. 
Also, information sharing is likely to curtail management's opportunistic behavior and 
increase the level of trust that labor has for management. In a repeated game situation where the 
interdependence between labor and management is likely to continue in the future, provision of 
private, business information is likely to enable labor to detect management's deception and 
curtail opportunistic behavior. Moreover, labor is more likely to develop trust in management 
that voluntarily shares information. Overall, by avoiding the negative consequences of 
management's moral hazard and increasing the positive effects of labor's cooperative behavior, 
information sharing is likely to have favorable effects on productivity. 
B. Human Capital Effects of HRMPs 
JLMCs, SFCs, and SGAs may play an important role of providing employees a voice in the firm 
and thus reduce the costs of exit from the firm, saving specific human capital. In the absence of 
unions, these arrangements may provide the sole voice mechanism, while in the presence of 
unions they may supplement the direct voice mechanism of unions. Also, in order to own shares 
privately, the average employee participant in a Japanese ESOP must stay with the firm for a 
significant number of years (Jones and Kato, 1995). This vesting feature would be expected to 
discourage employee turnover and promote the formation of more firm-specific human capital. 
2
 In the context of trade unions, the argument was first developed by Freeman (1976). 
12 
C. Complementary Effects of HRMPs 
Information sharing and financial participation are likely to have complementary effects on 
productivity through goal alignment processes, with financial participation directly aligning 
employees' and management's goals, and information sharing indirectly aligning two parties' 
goals by modifying employee perceptions and expectations regarding management's behavior. 
Three specific mechanisms may be proposed. First, as Levine and Tyson (1990: 209) argue that 
successful information sharing will require financial participation schemes that assure financial 
rewards for continued participation in information sharing by employees. Information sharing, 
which induces employees' cooperative behavior is not likely to be effective over a long haul in 
the absence of tangible rewards, since employees may lose interest in being cooperative and 
reduce their loyalty. 
Second, successful financial participation may also require information sharing, in part, 
due to the role which information sharing plays in reducing management's moral hazard. One of 
the important preconditions for a successful financial participation scheme is that employees 
need to believe that management is honest in reporting the status of the firm to both employees 
and outside markets. Management, which voluntarily shares financial and other business 
information knowing that such information may be used to discipline their own behavior, is also 
not likely to engage in deceptive and opportunistic behavior in financial participation schemes. 
Third, Weitzman and Kruse (1990: 100) argue that profit sharing works only when the 
free rider problem is effectively eased. Arguably the free rider problem will be alleviated when 
workers develop a strong long-term commitment to the company, so that workers face a repeated 
game, and/or when workers engage in active peer monitoring. As discussed above, information 
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sharing can be thought of a mechanism to facilitate the development of a long-term commitment 
to the firm by its workers. 
Discussion on the complementarities among HRMPs often neglects potentially important 
complementarities between participation at the top level and participation at the grass roots level. 
It is quite possible that information sharing at the top level without information sharing at the 
grass roots level results in a significant gap between labor representatives (often union officials) 
and the rank and file in terms of their sense of goal alignment with management. The gap may 
not only reduce the overall goal alignment between labor and management but create a complex 
coordination problem of the three distinct constituencies: management, labor leaders, and the 
rank and file. Apathy, a sense of alienation, and hence reduced morale of the rank and file may 
result. 
In addition, as Koike (1978: 196) suggests, information sharing at the grass roots level 
may complement information sharing at the top level by providing a forum for information 
shared at the top level to be disseminated to the rank and file. For instance, as we discussed, 
SFCs of Japanese firms facilitate sharing of information concerning not only standard shop-floor 
issues but business and corporate strategic plans which are discussed during the JLMC meetings. 
D. Evidence 
In spite of the importance of the postwar Japanese experience with HRMPs, there is not much 
systematic investigation of the economic effects of HRMPs in Japan. For the economic effects 
For U.S. corporations, however, we are presently witnessing an impressive growth of evidence. See, for 
example, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Freeman, Kleiner, and Ostroff (1997), Black and Lynch (1997), 
Freeman and Kleiner (1998), Susan Helper (1998) and articles featured in a special issue of Industrial Relations 
(Vol. 35, July 1996). Many of these recent studies in the U.S. use plant-level panel data within a narrowly defined 
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of financial participation, the Japanese bonus payment system has attracted considerable attention 
and controversy, in particular the claim that it is a form of a PSP. Earlier studies focused on the 
effects on employment of the Japanese bonus payment system. Freeman and Weitzman (1987) 
use industry-level aggregate data to show the statistically significant positive correlations 
between bonuses and employment level. However, Brunello (1991) uses firm-level micro data, 
and finds no statistically significant positive correlations between bonuses and employment level 
for the electric machinery, car and steel industries.4 More recent studies turned to the issue of the 
productivity effects of the Japanese bonus payment system. Jones and Kato (1995) use firm-level 
panel data to find that there is a modest productivity gain from the bonus system. Ohkusa and 
Ohtake (1997) find that firms with a statistically significant positive correlation between their 
wages and per capita profit are 9 percent more productive than firms without such a correlation. 
For ESOPs, Jones and Kato (1995) use firm-level panel data to find that the introduction of an 
ESOP will lead to a 4 to 5 percent increase in productivity and that this productivity payoff does 
not appear immediately. 
For the economic effects of information sharing at the top level, Morishima (1991a; 
1991b) use firm-level micro data to find the statistically significant positive correlations between 
the extent of information sharing through JLMCs and productivity, and the statistically 
industry. The benefits of using such data are probably less dramatic for Japan than for the U.S. since Japanese firms 
are generally substantially smaller (see, for instance, Kato and Rockel, 1992's comparative study of the 1,000 most 
valuable corporations between the two nations), and their management appears to be less decentralized than U.S. 
firms. Based on our interviews with managers in human resource at the corporate level and top managers in 
marketing/sales and accounting/finance at the business unit level of Japanese and U.S. corporations, the power of 
human resource department at the corporate level relative to top management at the business unit level appears to be 
much stronger in Japan than in the U.S. In addition, as Jones and Kato (1995) and Kato and Morishima (1998) 
show, there are substantial lags (up to 10 years) in the productivity effects of HRMPs in Japan. Plant-level data 
seldom provide long longitudinal data and thus may not be as useful in the context of the postwar Japanese 
experience as in the context of the current U.S. experimentation. 
4
 He does find, however, the statistically significant positive correlation between bonuses and employment 
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significant correlations between stronger JLMCs and shorter and smoother wage negotiation. 
Unfortunately, for Japanese firms, there is no micro data, especially panel data providing 
information on groups of HRMPs such as JLMCs, SFCs, SGAs, ESOPs and PSPs. The lack of 
such data has limited severely the ability of prior studies to study the effects of financial 
participation schemes and information sharing practices of Japanese firms simultaneously.5 This 
weakness in the available empirical evidence is especially troublesome since several authors have 
recently developed and investigated hypotheses that some HRMPs may be more effective when 
used in combination with other HRMPs.6 Furthermore, no study has been able to distinguish 
information sharing at the grass roots level (SFCs) from information sharing at the top level 
(JLMCs). 
It is against this backdrop of limited data that we conceived the idea of a survey of 
Japanese firms, the HRM Survey of Japanese Firms, from which such panel data can be 
assembled. The survey was administered in collaboration with Professor Morishima at Keio 
University's Keio Economic Observatory during the summer of 1993. The sample universe of 
level for the textiles industry. 
5
 The lack of such data resulted in some researchers resorting to an indirect approach to identify the 
presence of information sharing by estimating for each firm the correlations between the profit level and the 
bargaining period. Thus, Ohkusa and Ohtake (1997) assume that the absence of a statistically significant correlation 
between the profit level and the bargaining period is an indication of the presence of information sharing, and 
proceed to estimate the productivity differences between firms with and without such correlations. Unfortunately, 
the highly indirect nature of their approach to identify the presence of information sharing sometimes makes it 
difficult to interpret their findings (for example, the productivity of firms with both information sharing and financial 
participation was estimated to be nearly 50 percent higher than other firms). Moreover, since their indirect approach 
required them to assume that the presence of profit sharing and information sharing are time-invariant and thus 
prevented them from using standard fixed effects models to account for a well-known problem of firm heterogeneity. 
The collection of a new panel data, which contains information on the presence of information sharing mechanisms 
and financial participation schemes allows researchers to measure their presence directly and use standard fixed 
effects model to account for the issue of firm heterogeneity. In addition, such data allow researchers to differentiate 
between information sharing at the top level and at the grass-roots level, which proves to be important. 
6
 See, for instance, Fitzroy and Kraft (1987); Weitzman and Kruse (1990); Levine and Tyson (1990); Jones 
and Pliskin (1991); Ben-Ner and Jones (1992); Kandel and Lazear (1992); Kruse (1993); Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1994); Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994); Milgrom and Roberts (1995); Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), 
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the FIRM Survey of Japanese firms was the Toyo Keizai Kaisha Shiki Ho that provides a list of 
all firms listed in Japan's three major stock exchanges, Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. In 1993 there 
were 2,127 firms listed in those three exchanges. 
The survey itself was preceded by a pilot phase in which an earlier version of the 
instrument was tested on human resource managers of several firms as well as on researchers of 
the Japan Institute of Labor, the Japan Productivity Center, and the Japan Securities Research 
Institute who conducted similar yet smaller surveys separately in the past. On the basis of what 
we learned from this, the questionnaire was revised. The final version of the questionnaires were 
mailed to Director of HR/Personnel (Jinji Bucho) of all 2,127 firms using a list of addresses from 
the Toyo Keizai Kaisha Shiki Ho in August of 1993. 
We received usable responses from 371 firms (a response rate of 17%). Among those, 
there were 226 firms in manufacturing (a response rate of 20% for manufacturing alone). The 
response rate of 17% (20% for manufacturing) is comparable to most prior surveys of similar 
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nature in Japan. We did attempt to prompt the non-respondents by phone but our effort was 
largely unsuccessful. 
To study the representativeness of our sample, we try to compare the proportion of firms 
that have each HRMP in our sample and in the population. Such comparison is usually not feasible 
due to the absence of the data on the population. Fortunately, however, insofar as ESOPs are 
Black and Lynch (1997), Helper (1998) and articles featured in a special issue of Industrial Relations (Vol. 35, July 
1996). 
7
 Our sample universe is virtually all listed firms in Japan. The only listed firms not included in the sample 
universe are a very small number of firms listed only in other local stock exchanges (about three dozens). 
8
 For instance, in June of 1991, the Rengo Sogo Seikatsu Kaihatsu Kenkyu Jo (Rengo Research Institute of 
General Life Development) mailed their questionnaire asking questions on labor conditions and information sharing 
to 6,800 firms (including both public and private firms in Japan) and received usable responses from 689 firms (a 
response rate of 10%). In June of 1989, the Japan Productivity Center mailed their questionnaire asking questions 
on HRMPs to 1030 firms in Japan and received usable responses from 203 firms (a response rate of 19.7%). 
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concerned, all firms listed on Japan's stock exchange markets respond to the Survey of Stock Distri-
bution (Kabushiki Bunpu Jyokyo Chosa) which has been conducted annually since 1973 by the 
National Conference Board of Securities Exchanges (Zenkoku Shoken Torihikijyo Kyogikai). 
Using the Survey of Stock Distribution, we computed that 95 percent of all listed firms had ESOPs 
for 1993. Reassuringly the corresponding figure from our sample is 97 percent. Moreover, we also 
found out that the rate of participation of employees in ESOPs in 1993 was about 50 percent both in 
our sample and in the population. 
With regard to JLMCs, SFCs and PSPs, the pertinent information on the population is not 
available, and thus strict comparison between our sample and the population is not possible. 
Nevertheless, we did find that close to 20 percent of firms in our sample had a PSP in 1985 and 
that this figure is comparable to that reported by a large governmental survey called the General 
Survey of Wages and Hours Worked System (Chingin Rodojikan Seido to Sogo Chosa) in the 
same year. Finally, about 77 percent of firms in our sample were found to have a standing JLMC 
in 1988, the figure quite similar to the one reported by a larger governmental survey by the 
Ministry of Labour (the Survey of Labor-Management Communications, Roshi Komyunikeishon 
Chosa) in the same year.9 
Kato and Morishima (1998) merged data from this new survey with corporate proxy 
statement data to create for the first time a panel data set for Japanese manufacturing firms that 
provides information on JLMCs, SFCs, ESOPs, and PSPs. The data are then used to estimate 
9
 Since the Ministry of Labour Survey is an establishment-level survey and includes many establishments of 
small private firms that are not included in our sample universe, the results are not strictly comparable to our survey 
results. However, the Survey reports the proportion of establishments with JLMCs for establishments of unionized 
firms that are probably closest to our sample universe. The Ministry reports that the figure for those establishments 
was 77.8 percent. 
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production functions augmented by variables to capture the effects of these HRMPs. 
Kato and Morishima (1998) find evidence for the importance of introducing groups of 
HRMPs in the following three areas: (i) information sharing at the top level; (ii) information 
sharing at the grass roots level; and (iii) financial participation. Specifically, moving from the 
traditional system of no HRMPs to a highly participatory system with HRMPs in all three areas 
lead to a significant 9-percent increase in productivity. The full productivity effect is, however, 
felt only after a long developmental phase (10 years). At the same time, they find no evidence 
for significant productivity gains from changing the industrial relations system from the 
traditional system to any intermediate systems which lack HRMPs in any one of the three key 
areas. 
Their findings suggest that the goal alignment process needs to be supported both by 
direct methods (financial participation) and indirect ones (information sharing). Furthermore, 
information sharing needs to take place not only at the top level but at the grass roots level. In 
other words, the goal alignment process occurs most strongly when the interests of the two 
parties are aligned through financial participation and when this interest alignment is facilitated 
by mechanisms both at the top level and at the grass roots level; this curtails parties' opportunistic 
behavior. 
Kato and Morishima (1998)'s findings also point to the importance of a long-term 
perspective in evaluating the success of HRMPs. First, it does take time for the goal alignment 
process to take root. It is highly unlikely that instituting a HRMP will instantly create significant 
interest alignment of groups of employees with the firm. Furthermore, there is substantial learning 
10
 Whereas the survey includes questions on SGAs, unfortunately including them in the regression analysis 
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by doing in the evolution of HRMPs. HRMPs "mature" over time and only matured HRMPs 
tend to yield significant productivity gains. 
VI. Evolving Practices in the 1990s 
The economic slowdown in the 1990s (in particular the recent financial crisis) and a rapidly 
aging workforce have allegedly been eroding Japan's participation-friendly environments. Have 
participatory employment practices that we find successful for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s been 
surviving in Japan in the 1990s? If so, how have they been evolving to deal with these new 
environments in the 1990s? Are there any differences between sectors in the survival of 
participatory employment practices? An examination of the recent Japanese experience with 
participatory employment practices will help us understand better two important questions 
regarding participation: (i) what are the conditions under which participatory employment practices 
are best introduced and best sustained; and (ii) in what way participatory employment practices will 
need to evolve when external environments change. To address these questions, we have been 
analyzing more recent data on participatory employment practices in Japan. In this section, we 
report some of our first findings on the evolving practices of ESOPs and JLMCs in the 1990s. 
a. ESOPs in the 1990s 
As described above, the National Conference Board of Securities Exchanges has been conducting 
annually the Survey of Stock Distribution to which all firms listed on Japan's stock exchange 
markets respond. The National Conference Board has recently released summary tables from 
resulted in a substantial loss of observations. 
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their 1997 Survey. Using these most recently published summary tables as well as earlier tables, 
we created Figures 1-3.11 Figure 1 shows the evolution of ESOPs in Japan over 1979-1997. 
In the 1980s, the share prices of most large corporations in Japan rose steadily. It is not 
too surprising under such steady growth of corporate profitability that ESOPs gained increasing 
popularity in Japan. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, both the proportion of firms with ESOPs and 
the ESOP participation rate (the proportion of the labor force in firms with ESOPs who 
participate in ESOPs) grew steadily in the 1980s. Moreover, the real market value of outstanding 
shares owned by ESOPs more than quadrupled and the real market value of outstanding shares 
owned by ESOPs per participant (the real value of the average stake) more than doubled in the 
1980s. The National Conference Board also published the average price of shares owned by 
ESOPs (the market value of outstanding shares owned by ESOPs divided by the total number of 
shares owned by ESOPs). The real value of this average price tripled in the 1980s. 
The steady growth of share prices ended rather abruptly at the end of the 1980s. For 
instance, the average firm listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange lost more than half its value in the 
early 1990s (Kang and Stulz, 1997). Reflecting this rapid asset price deflation in the early 1990s, 
the real market value of outstanding shares owned by ESOPs, the real value of the average stake, 
and the real value of the average price of shares owned by ESOPs fell sharply in the early 1990s. 
As shown in Figure 1, recovery from this sharp drop has been anemic. 
A most natural question concerning the responses of ESOPs to this seemingly powerful 
adverse shock is whether this adverse shock has been discouraging employees from participating 
11
 Although the Survey began in 1973, data on market value of outstanding shares owned by ESOPs became 
available only in 1979. Thus, our complete data on the evolution of ESOPs begin in 1979. 
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in ESOPs. Figure 1 shows a surprisingly calm response of the labor force in firms with ESOPs. 
The ESOP participation rate has not fallen in any significant way in the 1990s although its steady 
increase in the 1980s did stop in the 1990s: the ESOP participation rate rose in the 1980s by 9 
percentage points from 40 to 49 percent and has remained at 49 percent level in the 1990s. It is, 
however, unclear whether the stagnation of the participation rate in the 1990s is caused by the 
adverse financial shocks. At any rate, there has not been any sign of a frenzied exit of participants 
from ESOPs in response to the adverse financial shock in the 1990s. 
Consistent with this relatively calm response of employees, very few employers have 
terminated their ESOPs in response to the adverse financial shock. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, 
the proportion of firms with ESOPs has not fallen in the 1990s and ESOPs have continued to be 
a near universal phenomenon among publicly traded firms in Japan (95 percent of all publicly 
traded firms have ESOPs). 
Overall, it appears that neither employees nor employers have panicked in the face of the 
adverse financial shock in the 1990s. In addition to the summary table for all publicly traded 
firms, the National Conference Board publishes the summary table for two-digit industries. 
Conceivably the adverse shock might have been hitting certain industries particularly hard and 
for those hard-hit industries, many ESOPs might have been terminated and the ESOP 
participation rate might have been falling significantly. To see if this is the case, we produced 
Figures 2 and 3. As shown in Figure 2, we failed to find any noteworthy example of such 
industries in terms of the termination of ESOPs. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 3, the 
ESOP participation rate has fallen to a non-trivial extent from 1988 to 1995 for mining, textiles, 
steel, primary metals, transportation equipment, communications, wholesale and retail trade, 
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finance and insurance, real estate, and service. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the ESOP 
participation rate has risen substantially over the same time period for a few industries, in 
particular oil and coal, land transportation, water transportation and transportation by air. 
b. JLMCs in the 1990s 
The Survey of Labor-Management Communications conducted in 1995 by the Ministry of 
Labour provide the most recent aggregate data on JLMCs. The same survey was conducted also 
in 1988 by the Ministry.12 Using various cross tabulations published from the 1995 survey as 
well as those from the 1988 survey, we produced Figures 4-11. 
First, Figure 4 shows how the proportion of establishments with JLMCs has changed 
from 1988 to 1995. For all establishments (labeled "total" in the figure), like in the case of 
ESOPs, the proportion of establishments with JLMCs has not fallen significantly over this time 
period. In other words, overall, the economic slowdown in the 1990s in general and the recent 
banking crisis in particular have not caused any significant dismantling of JLMCs. 
Again, conceivably the adverse shock might have been hitting certain sectors of the 
economy particularly hard and for those hard-hit sectors, the dismantling of JLMCs might have 
begun. To see if this is indeed the case, we repeated the same analysis for establishments in 
different industries, establishments of firms of differing size, and establishments of firms with 
and without a union. As shown in Figure 4, the proportion of establishments with JLMCs has 
declined noticeably for mining, services, transportation and communications, and non-union 
12
 Among all establishments in Japan that employ 50 or more employees, the Ministry of Labour selects 
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sectors although it is still premature to consider this an early sign of the crumbling of JLMCs for 
these sectors. 
The absence of evidence for the formal dissolution of JLMCs is probably not too 
surprising since if they decide to end JLMCs, Japanese firms are likely to make them dormant by 
changing their attributes (for example, reducing the frequency of meetings drastically and 
trivializing the content of information shared) rather than formally dissolving them. To this end, 
we created Figures 5 - 1 1 which illustrate whether various attributes of JLMCs have changed 
from 1988 to 1995 and if so in what way. 
Figure 5 shows the average number of JLMC meetings per year in 1988 and 1995. For all 
establishments, the frequency of JLMC meetings fell substantially from 14 times a year to 9 times a 
year over the time period. It appears that when news is consistently bad, JLMCs meet much less 
frequently. The figure also points to a considerable difference between sectors. Thus, JLMCs in 
transportation and communications used to hold JLMC meetings 25 times a year in 1988 while they 
held JLMC meetings only 11 times a year in 1995. The frequency of JLMC meetings in finance, 
insurance and real estate has also decreased sharply from 11 times a year in 1988 to only 6 times a 
year in 1995. JLMCs in larger and unionized firms experienced a sharper drop in the frequency of 
meetings from 1988 to 1995. 
Case histories of Japanese JLMCs suggest that JLMCs tend to function well with a number 
of special subcommittees, such as a special subcommittee on productivity and a special 
subcommittee on safety and health (Japan Productivity Center, 1990). As Figure 6 shows, the 
average number of special subcommittees for all establishments has declined somewhat from 3.3 in 
4000 of them and sends its researchers to each establishment. These experienced Ministry researchers then fill out 
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1988 to 2.8 in 1995. Some differences between sectors are also present. Sharp drops have occurred 
in manufacturing, services, and non-union sectors. 
A possible way of weakening information sharing is to undermine the democratic process 
of selecting employee representatives. In unionized establishments, the democratic selection of 
employee representatives is typically ensured by union representatives participating in JLMCs as 
employee representatives. In non-union establishments, it is normally ensured through election by 
employees. Figure 7 shows the proportion of unionized establishments with JLMCs in which 
union representatives participate in JLMCs as employee representatives in 1988 and 1995, and the 
proportion of non-union establishments with JLMCs in which employee representatives are elected 
by employees in 1988 and 1995. We failed to find any sign of erosion of the democratic selection 
of employee representatives over this time period. 
The nature of information sharing changes considerably, depending on: (i) the content of 
information shared (for example, more or less sharing of information on business and strategic 
plans, such as sales and production plans, and the introduction of new technology/equipment, as 
compared to labor issues, such as layoffs, working hours, wages and bonuses, fringe benefits, and 
cultural activities/sports); and (ii) the nature of "consultation" (for instance, whether labor 
representatives are "informed only", or "asked for prior consent"). The Survey of Labor-
management Communication selects 16 issues (plus 2 more issues in 1995), such as basic 
business strategies, corporate restructuring, layoffs, and mandatory retirement, and asks each 
establishment with JLMCs whether it discusses each of these issues during its JLMC meetings. 
When the establishment responds positively, it is then asked whether management asks employee 
the questionnaire by asking each establishment questions from the questionnaire. 
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representatives for prior consent. 
We selected six issues that are of particular relevance to the economic slowdown in the 
1990s, especially the recent economic crisis, and created the last four figures. Figure 8 shows the 
proportion of unionized establishments with JLMCs that discussed each of these six issues 
(corporate restructuring, hiring and staffing, transfer of employees, layoffs, mandatory retirement, 
and severance pay/pension) in 1988 and 1995. Figure 9 shows the same figures for non-
unionized establishments. Likewise, Figures 10 and 11 show the proportion of union and non-
union establishments with JLMCs discussing each of these six issues that asked employee 
representatives for prior consent in 1988 and 1995. 
For both unionized and non-unionized establishments, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, 
JLMCs are slightly more likely to discuss transfer of employees and layoffs in 1995 than in 1988. 
For unionized establishments, JLMCs are slightly more likely to discuss mandatory retirement 
and severance pay/pension in 1995 than in 1988 while they are slightly less likely to discuss 
corporate restructuring and hiring and staffing in 1995 than in 1988. The opposite pattern is 
observed for non-unionized establishments. Overall, it is unclear whether JLMCs are more or 
less likely to discuss issues of topical relevance in 1995 than in 1988. 
Nevertheless, when one takes a close look at the nature of consultation on each of these 
six issues, a noteworthy difference between unionized and non-unionized establishments is 
revealed. As shown in Figure 10, JLMCs of unionized establishments discussing transfer of 
employees, layoffs, mandatory retirement, and severance pay/pension are more likely to ask 
employee representatives for prior consent in 1995 than in 1988. In stark contrast, as shown in 
Figure 11, JLMCs of non-unionized establishments discussing transfer of employees, layoffs, 
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mandatory retirement, and severance pay/pension are much less likely to ask employee 
representatives for prior consent in 1995 than in 1988. This contrast in the changing nature of 
consultation over this time period between unionized and non-unionized establishments may 
suggest that unions effectively prevent JLMCs from becoming dormant by keeping the strong 
consultative role of JLMCs. As such, unions and JLMCs may be complements rather than 
substitutes. 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that: (i) as a result of favorable environments in the postwar 
Japanese economy, in particular in manufacturing, participatory employment practices were 
diffused widely and established firmly; (ii) they have positive effects on company performance; 
(iii) the full effects are, however, felt only after a long developmental phase; (iv) there exist the 
complementarities among them; and (v) they appear to be surviving in general in the economic 
slowdown in the 1990s whereas subtle yet potentially important changes in their attributes are 
taking place. 
The complementarities of these participatory employment practices suggest that 
terminating a single practice will not only eliminate its own positive effect but reduce the 
positive effects of other practices. In the extreme case, the termination of a single practice may 
cause the whole system of employee participation and labor-management cooperation to halt. 
For example, it was found that the goal alignment process needed to be supported both by direct 
methods (financial participation) and indirect ones (information sharing). Removing financial 
participation will cause information sharing to be ineffective and vice versa. Furthermore, it was 
found necessary for information sharing to take place not only at the top level but at the grass 
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roots level. Discontinuing information sharing at the grass roots level will cause information 
sharing at the top level to be ineffective, and vice versa. 
Moreover, research points to the importance of a long-term perspective in evaluating the 
success of participatory employment practices. Coupled with the importance of the long-term 
perspective, the complementarities of participatory employment practices will probably make 
individual Japanese employment practices more enduring than the popular rhetoric of "the end of 
Japanese employment practices" suggests. Our preliminary findings on the responses of 
participatory employment practices to the economic slowdown in the 1990s do point to the 
enduring nature of Japanese participatory employment practices. Japanese firms appear to be 
responding to the economic slowdown in the 1990s and the recent financial crisis in particular by 
fine-tuning the existing practices not by dismantling them. 
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